In this paper, we extend concepts from product family and platform design and mass customisation to create a method for a universal product family design. The objective of this paper is to develop a universal design method to generate an economically feasible design concept and evaluate the design feasibility with respect to disabilities within a product family in uncertain market environments. We consider a platform-level problem as a module selection problem for determining design parameters in variant modules for unique or common modules by minimising the production cost and maximising accessibility in a universal product family. In particular, a Bayesian game is employed to model uncertain situations regarding market environments. The proposed method is used to decide strategic equilibrium solutions for selecting modules in the universal product family being designed. To demonstrate implementation of the proposed method, we use a case study involving a family of kitchen products.
Introduction
Universal design is a reasonably well accepted term for designing for persons with a disability (Mace, 1985) . Universal design specifically suggests the concepts of equity and social justice. Also, in the context of separate is not equal, universal design suggests the design of solutions that simultaneously and equally serve both the fully able and not fully able. Since the 1964 passage of the Civil Rights Act, significant advances have been made with respect to the rights of persons with disabilities. As the Civil Rights Act fostered the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and more recently 1990's American with Disabilities Act (ADA), activists working with government have legislated the inclusion of persons with disabilities fully into all facets of living (Wodatch, 1990) . The economic (both in terms of the ability to produce and consume goods and services), ethical, and legal rational for inclusion is clear.
Mass customisation offers an avenue to provide persons with disabilities a wide array of products. Using mass customisation methods, companies are increasing their efforts to reduce cost and lead-time for developing new products and services while satisfying individual customer needs. Mass customisation depends on a company's ability to provide customised products or services based on economical and flexible development and production systems (Silveria et al., 2001) . By sharing and reusing assets such as components, processes, information, and knowledge across a family of products and services, companies can efficiently develop a set of differentiated offerings by improving flexibility and responsiveness of product and service development (Simpson, 2004) . Product family design is a way to achieve cost-effective mass customisation by allowing highly differentiated products to be developed from a common platform while targeting products to distinct market segments (Shooter et al., 2005) .
In this paper, we extend methods from mass customisation and product family design to create specific methods for universal product family design that can offer value to persons with disabilities while simultaneously providing profitability to the producer. The objective of this research is to develop a universal design method to generate economically feasible product families in uncertain market environments. In this case, the universal product family includes products for persons with and without a disability. We use a module-based platform design by introducing universal modules, accessible modules, and typical modules for universal product family design.
In this research, we will consider a platform design problem as a module selection problem that identifies a module or modules that establishes a viable product platform and associated product family. The primary trade off is minimising production cost while maximising accessibility of the universal product family. We will use market-based decision-making approaches to consider dynamic design and market environments. Specifically, a Bayesian game is employed to model uncertainty in market environments and determine strategic equilibrium solutions in the universal product family platform. Game theoretic approaches provide a rigorous framework for managing and evaluating strategies to achieve players' goals using their complete or incomplete information and knowledge (Gibbons, 1992; Osborne and Rubinstein, 2002) .
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature and background for universal design and product family design. Section 3 describes the proposed method for determining a module-based platform design strategy using a Bayesian game. Section 4 gives a case study using a family of kitchen products. Closing remarks and future work are presented in Section 5.
Literature review and background

Universal design
Before reviewing the related work in universal design, it is worth briefly touching on terminology. Within the community that serves persons with disabilities, multiple terms are used, including universal design, accessible design, inclusive design, design for all, and barrier free design, to indicate goods and services for persons with disabilities. There is ongoing discussion about the precise meanings, overlap, and best use of the terms. The ideal intent of the term universal design is that the exact same product is equally usable by all persons -though frequently a 90th percentile usability threshold is used. Though these discussions have philosophical and practical importance, we do not intend to achieve a resolution to that discussion here. In the general context of designing products for users with some level of disability, we will use the term universal design. Here, we wish to focus on the design method and save the discussion of terminology for a different venue. Nevertheless, we will use the terms universal, accessible, and typical with some specific differences in the context of our discussion.
A team of researchers organised through The Center for Universal Design at North Carolina State University has created seven principles of universal design (Connell et al., 1997) For each principle, several guidelines have been created. For example, principle 6 has a guideline of 'minimise repetitive actions'. These principles have been well received by designers in a range of disciplines. Though the seven principles of universal design provide high-level guidance, they provide more of an evaluation aid than a design or synthesis aid for product design. Vanderheiden (1997) has developed a set of guidelines for the design of consumer products. Some of these guidelines are useful for evaluation but more challenging to use for product synthesis. Housed in the Center for Inclusive Design and Environmental Access at the University of Buffalo is an active group of researchers with focus on universal design (Danford, 2003; Feathers, 2004) . Though this group is focused on architectural design and comes from an architectural background, they have performed research on appliances and other applications that extend to product design. A team of researchers at the University of Cambridge has produced implementable results for universal design (Langdon et al., 2008; Clarkson et al., 2003) . The focus of this research group has been in modelling user groups, creating product assessment methods, and extending the needs of universal design to modern product design processes. The results of the Cambridge team are the most directly applicable to product design. Their effort has been primarily focused on the user and the design challenges of accommodating that user.
Universal design is an active research area. Nevertheless, fundamental work applicable to product design is still a sparsely populated space. Universal design is more of an objective than a systematic design approach. There is little in the way of a prescriptive approach to universal design in more detail than broad design objectives (Bowe, 2000) . Additionally, though creating modular products that minimise modification to become universal is a recognised approach to universal design, specific knowledge and methods strategies to do it do not exist (Clarkson et al., 2003) . Methods that allow the design of universal products that offer value to the user and profitability to the producer have yet to be thoroughly developed.
Product family and platform design
A product family is a group of related products based on a product platform, facilitating mass customisation by providing a variety of products for different market segments cost-effectively . A successful product family depends on how well the trade-offs between the economic benefits and performance losses incurred from having a platform are managed. Simpson et al. (2001) introduced a method to optimise a platform by minimising performance loss and maximising commonality. Gonzalez-Zugasti et al. (2000) designed platform modules to minimise design risk and save costs related to develop a product family. Moore et al. (1999) used conjoint analysis to help determine a product platform. Siddique and Rosen (2000) described a method to design a platform from an existing group of products by comparing commonalities in assembly processes. Rai and Allada (2003) used a two-step approach to determine a modular platform for a product family, which consists of an agent-based optimal technique and post-optimisation analysis using the quality loss function. Johannesson and Claesson (2005) proposed a configurable product platform design process and model using an operative product structure and a hierarchical function-mean tree to capture parameters describing design information such as rules, variants, requirements, and product configuration possibilities. Thevenot et al. (2007) developed the Design of Commonality and Diversity Method (DCDM) to provide designers with recommendations for both the functional and component levels by the inherent tradeoff between commonality and diversity during product family and platform development. Moon et al. (2008) introduced a market-based negotiation mechanism to support product family design by determining an appropriate platform level that represents the number of common modules using a dynamic multi-agent system in an electronic market environment.
In a highly competitive market, universal design can be considered as an appropriate marketing strategy by providing for the broadest market segment (Preiser and Ostroff, 2001 ). In the context of universal product family design, a method to produce a variety of products should be considered to reflect a variety of customer needs and preferences. In addition, dynamic factors, such as trends, companies' strategies, and technologies, should be considered to increase customer's satisfaction in developing a family of products. Therefore, we need to address how to capture the dynamic factors in a family of universal products. Market-based product design is one way to reflect various dynamic market environments in product design. In the next section, the proposed method for strategic module-based platform design in a universal product family is discussed in detail.
Strategic module-based platform design
We propose the process for developing a universal product family based on Customer Needs (CNs) as shown in Figure 1 . Information required to identify CNs can be collected by surveying prospective customers and by conducting a marketing study that begins by establishing target markets and customers. In the initial phase, CNs are analysed to understand customer intention and determine a strategy for developing a product family. For example, the number of products can be decided by customer groups and classified according to CNs. CNs are also used to identify appropriate Functional Requirements (FRs), which are then mapped to the CNs. Behaviours and functions for designing a product can be identified based on customers' needs and functional requirements using a functional model (McAdams et al., 1999) . In product design, FRs describe a product's behaviour and features that are defined by technical information and data for its design. During conceptual design, products can be designed based on FRs, and their functional modules can also be determined. A product platform consists of several common modules that can be shared across a family of product. After developing platform design strategies, through evaluation for products, a final platform is determined to provide universal product families according to design characteristics and market segments. 
Universal product platform framework
The universal product platform framework is built on representing the product space in terms of five different modules: common modules, varietal modules, universal modules, accessible modules, and typical modules. The notion of common and varietal modules is generally a well understood concept in product family design. Common modules are those shared across the product family regardless of the module's characterisation with respect to typical and accessible products. In general, these common modules are suitable candidates for establishing the product platform. Varietal modules refer to the differing elements used to introduce variety into a range of products in the family. The common elements plus the varietal elements combined create a product family. The framework used to design a product family here is modular, but the notions of common and varietal need not be limited to a modular framework.
A module based product family strategy allows for the design and production of economically viable universal product families. Specifically, modules for universal design can be categorised into:
Universal modules are those that are the same in function and form for both typical and disabled users. Accessible modules provide specific functionality or form solutions for persons with limitations due to age and disabilities. Typical modules contain functional and form solutions, or both, that are not suitable for user with a disability. In the design of universal product families, different platform approaches need to be considered in an effort to create and leverage economies of scales. In evaluating approaches for a universal product family, the common modules evaluated as candidates for a product platform many come from universal or accessible modules, or some combination of both.
Using a product family design approach, economies of scale are leveraged across multiple typical and universal products simultaneously thus improving the ability to produce products that offer value to the consumer and profitability to the producer. The way in which the modules may interact to form different product families is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Platform design strategy and cost model
A well-defined platform reduces production costs by improving economies of scale and reducing the number of different components that are used . Platform level is defined as the number of modules in the platform that may contain the common functions (Moon et al., 2008) . An appropriate platform level for a universal product family can be determined by minimising the production costs associated with accessible modules and typical modules for commonality levels as mentioned in Section 3.1. The appropriate platform level for the universal product family can be represented as a mathematical programming model in which there is a trade off between production cost and customer satisfaction, or more practically, customers willingness to pay for the product. Based on generated product design concepts, production cost can be determined by life time product volume, material cost, direct labour, production resource usage, tooling and capitalisation costs, system cost (overhead or indirect costs), and development costs (Magrab, 1997) . To develop platform strategies, we introduce the expected strategy cost that represents production costs for developing a new platform for a product family. A designer determines a feasible set of strategies for the platform based on components' specifications and his/her design knowledge. The strategies for a platform are represented as alternative designs that can be constructed by combining components in common and varietal modules. Suppose that a product family consists of I products, PF = (P 1 , P 2 ,…P i ,…,P I ) and product i has n i components. Let S be a set of strategies and c(s y ) the expected strategy cost for designer's strategy s y (y = 1,…,S). Then, the expected strategy cost can be calculated based on product cost and family design as follows (Moon et al., 2008) :
where:
AC i = assembly cost for product i η = a factor for overhead cost f = strategy weight function associated with the benefit of family design as follows:
r = volume penalty factor related to product sales quantity.
For a given set of products, the value of c(s y ) varies depending on cost related to design for accessible or typical modules. The expected strategy cost function will be used to determine a platform for a universal product family and can be developed by various cost functions based on products' characteristics and company's strategy in product family development or both. The next section introduces a product quality model for evaluating accessibility in a universal product.
A product quality model for universal design
A usability testing and a participatory design model help designers evaluate design characteristics and functionalities for universal products in an early design process or a conceptual phase (Demirbilek and Demirkan, 2004; Beecher and Paquet, 2005) .
To evaluate and measure accessibility of a product, we propose a product quality function that is positively related to design accessibility level (L) and user skill level (S) as follows:
The design accessibility level represents a capability of supporting accessibilities by a product. The value of the accessibility level, 0 < L ≤ 1, can be determined based on the ICF (WHO, 2001) or the principles of universal design (Connell et al., 1997; Story, 1998) . For example, if a product is designed to support full accessibility, the value is 1. Otherwise, the value can be determined by design characteristics or parameters related to accessibilities. The accessibility level is problem-dependent, but an example can be found in the kitchen product case study. For the user skill level, we will categorise usability into five groups based on skill and capability in product utilisation ( The expected product quality, Q i for product i can be estimated by an expected quality function: : .
i f L S × ℜ Hence, the real number of ( , ) i f l s represents the quality of product i having accessibility level l for group s. For example, the expected product quality for product i can be determined as: ( , ) . 
The proposed product quality function will be applied to measure accessibility for determining product' values in terms of platform design strategies. In this research, we will consider a platform level problem as a component selection problem that is to determine design parameters in accessible modules, typical modules, or both by minimising the production cost and maximising accessibility in a universal product family. The next section discusses a Bayesian game model for determining a platform design strategy.
Bayesian game for decision-making
A platform selection problem can be considered as a strategic game with incomplete information. The strategic game provides a useful technique for determining a strategy in uncertain environments (Gibbons, 1992; Koessler, 2004) . In this paper, we employ a Bayesian game to solve the platform selection problem in given product family design. In the Bayesian game, the players' uncertainty about each other is described as a set of possible types (or type spaces) that represent incomplete information related to market share ratio and customers' preference in market environments. In this paper, the market share ratio is defined as the ratio of products sold to the total potential market volume of products. The customers' preference represents customers' behaviour that is willing to buy a product at a specific price: customer preference represents the ratio of customers who purchase the product at a specific price out of all potential purchasers. Consider the following a scenario for a platform design problem in an uncertain market environment. There are two players: 1 a designer who has platform design strategies for a product family 2 a customer who has prices they are willing to pay for a product.
The designer provides a product with the cost c, and the customer pays the price v for the product. The product's cost and the product's price are dependent on the market share ratio of the products and customer's preference, respectively. The market share ratio and the customer's preference are assumed to be independently and uniformly distributed based on their market situations that represent the product sales. For instance, the values of the market share ratio can be determined by the proportion of sales volumes. The cost and the price are constrained to be non-negative. We assume if the market share ratio is greater than or equal to the customer's preference, then the product will be produced at a price equal to the average of the product's cost and the product's price; otherwise, the product will not be produced. Finally, we assume that the players are risk-neutral for their payoffs. Each player knows his or her own payoff function but may be uncertain about the other player's payoff functions.
In order to formulate the proposed scenario as a Bayesian game, we must first identify the action spaces, the type spaces, the beliefs, and the payoff functions (Gibbons, 1992) . In this paper, Player 1 is a designer who knows platform design strategies for a product. Player 2 is a customer who wants to buy a product below some maximum price.
Player 1's action is to select a strategy among design strategies that are all possible combinations for the platform design. The set of actions, are the values of the market share ratio for the products that are contained within the product family. As an example in this game theoretic framework, the designer will have a higher different pay off for an action if that action leads to a higher market share and conversely a lower pay off for an action if it results in a lower market share. For computational purposes the values are obtained from 0 to 1 where 1 reflects full saturation of the product in some population. Because the values of the market share ratio are independent, Player 1's belief is explained as the probability, b 1 , that is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Therefore, Player 1's belief is the probability of selecting a value of the market share ratio with a uniform distribution.
Player 2's action is to determine the price of the product. The set of actions for Player 2, ). i n ∈ We assume that products' prices positively depend on their quality and customers' preference. The set of types of Player 2, 2 2 2 , 1 2 , 2 2 , { , , , }, m T t t t = … are represented by customer's preferences. The customer will try to select an action that gives a higher pay off based on the customer's preference. For computational purpose, the values of the preferences can be obtained from 0 to 1 where 1 means a customer is willing to buy a product with 100%. Because the values of the customer's preference are independent, Player 2's belief is represented as the probability, b 2 , that is uniformly distributed on [0,1] and is the probability of selecting a value of the customer's preference with a uniform distribution.
The actions and types, A 1 , A 2 , T 1 , and T 2 , are finite sets that are defined by the number of n 1 , n 2 , m 1 , and m 2 , respectively. Therefore, Player 1 may be uncertain about the Player 2's payoff functions, since Player 1 may be uncertain about the types of Player 2, denoted by t -1 . In this game, the probability distribution b 1 (t -1 |t 1 ) is defined as Player 1's belief about Player 2's types, t -1 , given Player 1's knowledge based on type, t i . According to the proposed scenario, Player 1 and Player 2 can have two possible payoff functions based on their selected types. The two players' payoff functions are given by: 
where c is the expected cost based on 1 a * and is calculated by the expected strategy cost mentioned in Section 3.3, and v is the price of the product based on 2 a * and is calculated by (the market price × the product quality × t 2 ). Formally, this game is denoted by In the scenario, Player 1 will try to seek to a platform that provides more profits from a product family in uncertain customers' preferences based on minimising the expected strategy cost in various market share ratios. Player 2 wants to buy a product that provides high quality while minimising product cost. In the proposed Bayesian game, a strategy for Player 1 can be represented by a function 1 1 ( ) a t specifying the market ratio that Player 1 would choose. In a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, Player 1's strategy 1 1 ( ) a t is a best response to Player 2's strategy 2 2 ( ), a t and vice versa. Based on Definition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (Gibbons, 1992) , The pair of strategies 1 1 2 2 ( ( ), ( )) a t a t is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, if for each t z in [0,1], (z = 1,2), a z (t z ) solves:
a t a t t b t t
For a given value of a 1 , the best response of Player 1 is obtained by:
where c is the expected strategy cost and is calculated by:
where y is the index of design strategies, y = 1,2,…,n 1 . v is the product price obtained by:
And, the probability of 1 2 t t ≥ is:
T T t t t t F t f t dt
where, For Player 2, we can obtain the best response through the same processes. In this game, strategies for Player 1 represent the various platform design methods depending on the design alternatives of accessible or typical modules in a product family. Therefore, design parameters' values for platform design can be determined by selecting strategies in uncertain market environments.
Case study
To demonstrate implementation of the proposed Bayesian game, a kitchen product family consisting of a bottle opener, a serrated peeler, a Y peeler, a grater, a potato masher, and a jar opener is investigated. These items are shown in Figure 4 . The Oxo Good Grips line of kitchen and hand-held products provide a good example of common and differing parametric solutions for cases where product functions remain the same. Also, they are a documented example of successful universal design (Mueller, 1997) . These products offer the opportunity to create a product family with the handle serving as a common module that constitutes the product platform and the end effectors as varietal modules. The objective in this case study is to determine a platform design strategy represented by accessible modules for the kitchen product family subject to an incomplete information environment. This case study focuses on how to model a game and find Bayesian Nash Equilibrium for the platform design of the family of kitchen products using the proposed game at the conceptual stage of development.
Platform design strategies and expected cost
Currently, these products have an accessible module related only to the grips at the platform level. Based on the information from product analysis, we can define components for designing accessible modules (i.e., grips) as shown in Table 1 . The design parameters include length, width, thickness, and materials. Bottle opener 9.9 mm 3.6 mm 2.5 mm Santoprene + Plastic (inside) Grater 9.9 mm 3.6 mm 2.5 mm Santoprene + Plastic (inside) Jar opener 9.9 mm 3.6 mm 2.5 mm Santoprene + Plastic (inside)
Since the grip module is an accessible module that consists of a component, we suppose that the module is involved in designing the platform. Therefore, appropriate design parameters for the accessible module can be determined by a game to design the platform in a product family. The designer can select components to develop design strategies based on design parameters. To develop platform design strategies for the case study, we consider the case where a typical product and the accessible product have the same functionality and essentially morphology of solution, but the parametric nature of the accessible product is different at some or all component levels. We will term these types of components Design Parameter (DP) components as the change from typical to accessible is a parametric design change to some different value or level, not a functional change. For representing the component cost of different DP values, we assume that the parameter component cost has a non-decreasing linear cost function for DP values creating a more accessible product. We recognise that this is not always the case, but if it is not then the designer is not faced with a cost-accessibility trade off. Let C j,i be component j cost of product i, DPC j be DP component cost of component j for a minimum DP value. Now, DP component cost can be formulated at the component level as follows: Table 2 shows possible grip design strategies of the grip module for a platform based on the results of the product analysis. We generate the numerical data based on unit cost that is depended on components' design parameter values. We assume that the component cost of a minimum parameter value is defined as 1 unit for length, width, thickness, respectively. We use a normalisation approach to determine the other component costs based on a minimum design parameter value. Table 2 shows the component cost of an accessible module that can be calculated by Equation (14). Suppose that Table 2 illustrates costs related to components for generating platform design strategies in a market. The other components for designing the products can be determined from an auction based on market mechanisms to minimise total production cost (Xia et al., 2004) . Based on the grip design strategies, we developed platform design strategies by the combination of different grips for the products. Table 3 shows six platform design strategies for the six products. The s m1 can be considered as a current grip design strategy. In this case study, we assume that the costs of universal components for all products are same. Therefore, the expected strategy cost focuses on accessible components for a platform. To determine the expected strategy cost, we use the expected cost functions, Equation (1). We assume that a factor of overhead is 2 units and an assembly cost for a product is 1 unit. Therefore, the expected strategy cost for s m2 is 1.353 units, if the value of a strategy weight and a volume penalty factor are 6 and 1, respectively. The value of a strategy weight can be determined by the proportion of the maximum numbers of products applying a DP component. For the individual product design strategies (s m1 , s m3 , or s m4 ), we used the average of the expected strategy costs for the products. To determine the expected qualities of products that are developed by the platform design strategies, we performed product analysis as shown in Table 4 . Table 5 shows six expected strategy costs, the market prices, and the product prices, when the values of Market Share Ratio (MSR) and Customers' Preference (CP) are both 1.
Bayesian game and results analysis
The game between a designer and a customer for platform design of this family is defined as the proposed Bayesian game described in Section 3.3. Table 6 summarises the Bayesian game for determining a platform strategy for an accessible module with two players. In this case study, the Bayesian game focuses on determining a DP component for a platform based on designer's action. Notes: * We assume that the design accessibility level of a grip is determined by the size of the grip. If the size is the same of the original one, the value of the level is 1. Otherwise, the value is 0.7 or 0.5 depending on the size. ** A safety is considered as the skill level.
Table 5
Expected strategy costs and product prices for the Grip module (MSL and CP = 1) 
To determine the best response of Designer and Customer, we performed a sensitivity analysis for various market share ratios based on Customer's strategies as mentioned in Section 3.4. Figure 5 shows the Designer's payoffs for platform strategies based on different market price strategies, when the Customer's preference is 0.6. The Designer's payoffs were calculated by Equations (6) through (8). Then, we determined a maximum payoff as Bayesian Nash Equilibrium within the given Customer's preference using Equations (10) through (13). In these cases, s m6 is a dominated strategy based on the Designer's payoff in six different market price strategies. Therefore, a grip module with length 9.9 mm, width 3.6 mm, and thickness 2.5 mm can be designed as a new platform. The case study also demonstrated that the platform-based design strategies (s m2 , s m5 , and s m6 ) provided more payoffs than the individual product design strategies. The results from a sensitivity analysis provide a designer with information for determining a platform strategy in an uncertain market environment. In conclusion, if the customer's preference is predicted as 0.6, a new platform for the six products can be identified as a grip with length 9.9 mm, width 3.6 mm, and thickness 2.5 mm. Comparing this to the current grips for the six products, we can take the benefit of family design based on common functional features in universal design.
Through the case study, the proposed Bayesian game was demonstrated to determine the DP value of an accessible module to select appropriate modules for the platform. Therefore, the Bayesian game can facilitate universal product family design in various dynamic market environments. 
Closing remarks and future work
This research presents a framework for designing universal products that have value to the customer and are profitable for the producer. By extending concepts from product family design to universal design, we have introduced a method for strategic module-based platform design between products in a universal product family through a game theoretic approach in an uncertain market environment. Module-based design was introduced to allow a range of trade-off in determining the specific platform configuration. To evaluate and measure accessibility of a product, we adapt a well established and thorough representation and rating method from the ICF. In this paper, we have focused on two players, a designer and a customer, to determine a platform design strategy for universal product family in a conceptual design phase. To more comprehensively capture the general product development process, we can increase players who are willing to participate in a game with their strategies related to product development (e.g., marking, assembly, production process, accounting, and sales). Therefore, all persons or teams related to product development can be assigned to be players based on the proposed game. In decision making for platform design, players can use various decision variables that are defined as products' characteristics based on design parameters (i.e., maintenance and recycle). This research provides with foundation for developing a strategic platform design process using a Bayesian game in an uncertain market environment.
Since an expected strategy cost function is sensitive to estimate players' payoffs in a game, a cost model is developed by development costs as well as operation costs according to products' characteristics, company's strategies, and a market environment. To explore the best response of players in Bayesian games, we should consider computationally intensive numerical integration such as Markov-chain or Monte-Carlo simulation methods for reflecting various market segmentation level and customer's preferences. Future research efforts will be focused on improving the efficiency of the method, developing cost models and design strategies for various universal product family environments, and comparing to the proposed game with other decision-making methods (e.g., collaboration, negotiation) for determining design parameters in a universal product family.
